Designig Labor Market Institutions by Olivier Blanchard et al.
There is fairly wide agreement among economists on what con-
stitutes optimal—or at least good—product market and financial
market institutions. There is much less agreement on what consti-
tutes optimal—or at least good—labor market institutions. As a re-
sult, the public debate is too often dominated by clichés and slogans.
“Get rid of labor market rigidities” is one of the most frequent. Mean-
while, policymakers focus on politically feasible, incremental reforms,
with little sense of the ultimate goal.
Economists could play a more useful role here. This is why Jean
Tirole and I decided to explore the optimal design of labor market
institutions. This paper represents a progress report.1 It gives a sense
of the general architecture we see coming out of our analysis.
It is probably best to start with three warnings. First, our re-
search so far has focused on unemployment insurance and employ-
ment protection, which we see as the two pillars of labor market
institutions. Many other dimensions are relevant, including minimum
wages, negative income taxes, labor laws, and collective bargaining.
We have not analyzed these issues in detail, so I only touch on them
here. Second, one size does not fit all. The economic principles we
derive are quite general, but the specifics are likely to differ across
countries, according to income level and institutional development.
What may be optimal for Sweden may not be optimal for Chile, for
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what is needed. The other half involves how to go from here to there,
how to improve existing institutions. As governments have learned,
labor market reforms face many political constraints. These con-
straints are very relevant, but I ignore them here. Characterizing
the goal comes first, and that is the focus of this paper.
1. A BENCHMARK
Let me start with a stark, simplistic benchmark. Consider an
economy in which workers are risk averse and firms are risk neu-
tral. Firms hire workers and put them into jobs. All jobs look the
same ex ante, that is, they have the same probability distribution. Ex
post, productivity differs across jobs. If the productivity of a job is
sufficiently low, the firm lays the worker off, and the worker becomes
unemployed.
What happens in this economy is straightforward. Firms, which
are risk neutral, insure workers, who are risk averse. They pay work-
ers a constant wage, independent of their realized productivity. If
they decide to lay some workers off, they pay them unemployment
benefits so as to fully insure them against unemployment. (Note that,
by offering such insurance to the risk averse workers, firms are able
not only to reduce wages, but also to reduce their expected labor
costs.)
The payment of unemployment benefits to the workers makes
the firms fully internalize the cost of unemployment for the workers
they lay off. The decision as to whether to lay off a worker is there-
fore socially efficient.
Now think of a different way of achieving the same outcome.
Suppose that, instead of making payments directly to the workers
they lay off, firms make these payments to an unemployment agency.
Call these payments unemployment contributions or layoff taxes; the
terminology does not matter. Also, let the unemployment agency pay
unemployment benefits to the laid-off workers.
This clearly leads to the same outcome as before. By construc-
tion, payments from firms to the agency are equal to the payments
from the agency to the unemployed. Firms face the same costs as
before, so they make the same decisions; workers receive the same
payments, so they get the same utility.
Given this equivalence, why introduce such an agency? Why not
let firms handle the payments themselves? There is, in fact, a goodDesigning Labor Market Institutions 369
reason. I assumed implicitly above that firms could fully insure work-
ers by paying unemployment benefits directly. In reality, individual
firms cannot easily provide unemployment insurance to laid-off work-
ers.  A one-time payment at the time of the layoff provides very poor
insurance against unemployment, since the main source of uncer-
tainty when becoming unemployed is how long one will remain un-
employed. A one-time payment offers no insurance against uncertain
duration.
Good unemployment insurance therefore requires payments of
unemployment benefits over time, conditional on whether the worker
is still unemployed and searching for another job. Individual firms
are not equipped to do this. Whether a laid-off worker is still unem-
ployed or has found another job is difficult enough for an individual
firm to verify. Monitoring the unemployed worker’s search effort goes
far beyond what a firm can do.
Hence, there is the need for an unemployment agency to check
on employment status, monitor search activity, and deliver the ben-
efits to the unemployed. The agency need not be a state agency. The
state, however, probably has to be involved, given that it already has
much of the infrastructure needed to check, monitor, and distribute
benefits.
If the agency pays unemployment benefits to the unemployed over
time, how does one ensure that firms still make contributions to the
agency equal to what the agency pays to the laid-off workers? This
can be achieved in one of two ways. It can be done ex ante: at the
time the layoff takes place, firms can pay the expected value of unem-
ployment benefits that the agency will pay to the worker who is laid
off. This expected value is likely to depend on the age, skills, and
geographic location of the worker, and it may be difficult to assess.
This suggests doing it ex post instead, while the worker is unem-
ployed: whenever the unemployment agency sends a benefit check to
an unemployed worker, these benefits are charged to the firm that
laid that worker off.
1.1 Taking Stock
The purpose of the benchmark was to convey a basic message.
The architecture of labor market institutions must be built on two
pillars: unemployment insurance and employment protection, in the
form of layoff taxes. To the extent that workers receive unemploy-
ment benefits, it is essential, for efficiency purposes, that firms take370 Olivier Blanchard
this cost into account when deciding whether to layoff workers. This
requires the use of layoff taxes, a form of employment protection.
This argument is straightforward, but it is at odds with the often-
heard position that the less employment protection the better. Ab-
sent layoff taxes, in our benchmark, firms would lay off more workers
than is socially efficient, in effect free-riding on the unemployment
benefits paid by the unemployment agency.
This basic message is general and important. The benchmark is
too simple, however, in that it rules out a number of relevant imper-
fections in the labor market. I now consider a number of these imper-
fections, with an eye to refining and modifying the basic message.
2. FOUR COMPLICATIONS
The benchmark made at least four implicit assumptions. First,
the unemployed can be fully insured. Second, firms can pay the layoff
taxes. Third, because workers are risk averse, they are willing to
accept lower wages in exchange for insurance, leading firms to offer
this insurance either directly (through direct payments) or indirectly
(through the unemployment agency). Fourth, all firms and all work-
ers are the same ex ante. All four assumptions are too strong. Let me
take each one in turn.
2.1 Limits to Insurance
Even if it were feasible to fully insure the unemployed, it would
not be desirable to do so. The reason is well understood: if unemploy-
ment implied no loss of utility, there would be no incentives for the
unemployed to search for jobs. The question is how such limits to in-
surance affect my earlier conclusions. A formal analysis yields two
conclusions. First, laid-off workers should receive the highest feasible
level of unemployment insurance consistent with search incentives.
This may sound obvious, but it has practical implications for the design
of unemployment insurance to which I return below. Second, layoff
taxes paid by firms should exceed the unemployment benefits paid to
laid-off workers. In other words, employment protection should be
higher than in the benchmark. Why? Given the utility loss in becom-
ing unemployed, it is optimal to distort the layoff decision of firms so as
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In short, if there are limits on unemployment insurance, it is
then optimal to have higher employment protection. This inverse
relation between unemployment insurance and employment protec-
tion fits the facts surprisingly well. Boeri, Conde-Ruiz, and Galasso
(2003) document a clear negative relation between the generosity of
unemployment insurance and the strictness of employment protec-
tion across European countries. A likely explanation is a political
economy story that parallels the optimality argument above: the less
generous the unemployment insurance (for whatever reason), the
stronger the political pressure to put in place restrictions on layoffs
and the stronger the degree of employment protection.
High employment protection is a partial substitute for unemploy-
ment insurance. It is a very poor substitute, however, because it en-
tails strong distortions and a potentially large efficiency loss. It impedes
reallocation, decreasing output and perhaps even affecting growth.
This has an important practical implication. Any reform of the unem-
ployment insurance system that delivers better insurance while main-
taining search incentives is useful not only on its own, but also
indirectly: it allows for a decrease in layoff taxes and thus reduces
distortions.
A number of recent reforms of unemployment insurance systems
offer increased benefits in exchange for stronger penalties for unem-
ployed workers who either do not search or do not accept job offers.
These efforts are promising. They relax the limits on insurance and
offer the hope of reducing employment protection to a more efficient
level.
2.2 Limits to Layoff Taxes
The benchmark assumed that firms were risk neutral and able to
pay the layoff taxes. This assumption is too strong. Many small firms
have a single owner, who is likely to be risk averse and unable to
diversify the firm’s risk. Even larger firms may be facing financial
constraints. Layoffs, by their very nature, tend to take place when
firms are not doing well. The firm may thus be unable to pay the
layoff taxes. Even if the firm can pay, this may come at a high cost,
perhaps forcing the firm to close other operations or preventing in-
vestment crucial to its future.
One of the things the state can do, instead of forcing firms to pay
layoff taxes at the time layoffs take place, is to shift payments to
times when the firm is in better financial shape. This is the principle372 Olivier Blanchard
behind the system in place in the United States. The details vary
from state to state, but essentially the unemployment agency keeps
a running balance for each firm, registering the benefits that the
agency pays to workers laid-off by the firm on the debit side and the
firm’s payments to the agency on the credit side. At regular inter-
vals, the firm pays a proportion of the remaining balance. The lower
this proportion, the longer the implied average time between the
payments of benefits to the workers and the payment of contribu-
tions by the firm.
Such a system may alleviate the problem, but it is unlikely to
eliminate it. Some firms may still not be in a strong financial position
when the tax comes due. It may therefore be optimal for the state to
impose lower layoff taxes than in the benchmark, thus decreasing
the burden on firms in difficulty. If financial constraints vary system-
atically across types of firms, then it is better to tailor the tax rate for
different categories of firms than to decrease the layoff tax rate for
all firms. It may be optimal, for example, to levy a lower tax on new
and young firms, which tend to be financially constrained, while leav-
ing the rate higher for established firms.
In short, the presence of financial constraints may require a de-
crease in layoff taxes relative to the benchmark. The unemployment
agency must still be financed, however. If layoff taxes are lower, the
rest of the funds must be raised through higher payroll taxes. The
overall architecture now has unemployment insurance on one side
and layoff and payroll taxes on the other. Moreover, the decrease in
layoff taxes implies that firms will lay off too many workers relative
to the benchmark. Given the presence of financial constraints, how-
ever, this is the best that can be done.
2.3 Ex Post Wage Bargaining
The benchmark assumed that because workers were risk averse,
the provision of insurance by firms (either directly or indirectly through
the unemployment agency) allowed the firms to decrease wages and
expected labor costs. Indeed, in the benchmark, the state did not
have to force firms to join the unemployment-insurance-cum-layoff-
tax system; they did so voluntarily.
This assumption raises an old issue in labor economics: namely,
how wages are set. Before they are hired, risk averse workers will be
willing to accept lower wages in exchange for the provision of unem-
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to renegotiate wages, and by then the bargaining conditions are very
different. If bargaining fails and the workers are laid off, they are
now entitled to unemployment benefits and the firm has to pay a
layoff tax. Both factors clearly strengthen the workers’ bargaining
position, so the wage may well go up.2
Hence, if wages are at least partly determined ex post, the provi-
sion of unemployment insurance is likely to lead to higher, not lower,
wages. The same applies to layoff taxes: the higher the layoff taxes,
the more expensive it is for the firm to lay off workers, which weak-
ens the firm’s bargaining position and thus raises the wage.
The precise characterization of the optimal architecture in this
case depends on the details of bargaining and the characterization of
the rest of the economy. Based on an analysis of some simple cases,
two conclusions appear to hold quite generally. To the extent that
higher unemployment benefits increase wages and therefore increase
firms’ costs, these benefits should be lower than in the benchmark.
And to the extent that higher layoff taxes strengthen the bargaining
position of workers, further increasing wages and firms’ costs, layoff
taxes should be lower than unemployment benefits, with the differ-
ence financed by payroll taxes.
2.4 Heterogeneity
The benchmark ignored ex ante heterogeneity of firms and work-
ers. All jobs and all workers looked the same ex ante. This is obvi-
ously not the case. For example, some firms operate in volatile markets
and so are likely to have a higher layoff rate than firms in more
stable sectors. Some workers, because of individual characteristics
such as lack of work experience, represent a greater risk to the firm
than do others, and they are more likely to be laid off. This heteroge-
neity has implications for the design of tax rates.
I focus here on worker heterogeneity; parallel arguments can be
extended to the case of firm heterogeneity. When firms have to pay
high layoff taxes, they are reluctant to hire workers whom they may
have to lay off. Depending on how wages are set, these high-risk
workers may have to accept lower wages in order to be hired or may
simply not be hired at all.
2. This effect is well captured by the assumption of Nash bargaining in mod-
ern flow-bargaining models (as presented, for example, in Pissarides, 2000), but it
is clearly more general than this particular class of models.374 Olivier Blanchard
Decreasing layoff taxes below unemployment benefits can help
alleviate the bias against these high-risk workers. Again, specific
groups of workers should be targeted. For example, the tax structure
may provide preferential treatment for new entrants—workers with-
out a work history. If firms that lay off new entrants are subject to
lower layoff taxes, this reduces their incentives to discriminate against
new entrants in hiring. In addition, contracts might include a trial
period during which either workers or firms can separate at no cost,
allowing both parties to assess the quality of the match before layoff
taxes enter into force.
2.5 Taking Stock
The benchmark established a simple architecture, with full un-
employment insurance on one side, employment protection on the
other side, and layoff taxes equal to unemployment benefits. A closer
look suggests a number of amendments. Limits to insurance point to
increasing layoff taxes relative to the benchmark. Financial con-
straints suggest instead decreasing layoff taxes relative to the bench-
mark. Ex post bargaining suggests decreasing both unemployment
benefits and layoff taxes. Heterogeneity suggests treating different
categories of firms or groups of workers differently—for example, by
applying lower layoff taxes to young firms and new workforce en-
trants or by introducing a trial period when neither unemployment
benefits nor layoff taxes apply.
All these amendments take the form of changes in the level of
unemployment benefits, or in the level and composition of taxes. One
issue I have not discussed is the role of judges in the process. This is
an important issue, since employment protection has an important
judicial component in most countries. To think about it, it is impor-
tant to introduce the distinction between layoffs and quits. Not all
separations are layoffs; many are quits, triggered not by a change in
the productivity of the job, but by the offer of another job to the worker
or by increased worker dissatisfaction with the current job. To the
extent that firms only pay layoff taxes and workers only receive un-
employment benefits in the case of a layoff, this opens the scope for
games between firms and workers. Firms that want to layoff a worker
may harass the worker into quitting in order to save on the layoff
tax. Workers who want to quit may misbehave so as to be laid off,
thus getting unemployment benefits. If layoff taxes are less than un-
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games, this time with workers and firms on one side and the state on
the other. Workers and firms may collude and declare quits to be
layoffs, getting a net subsidy from the state.
In all these cases, the incentives to misbehave depend on the
generosity of benefits and the level of layoff taxes. Judges must clearly
be involved in cases of disagreement between firms and workers. If,
however, a firm is willing to declare a separation a layoff and pay the
layoff tax, there is no obvious reason for judges to become involved
and potentially overturn the decision of the firm or require additional
payments. I insist on this last point because in many countries, judges
can and do second guess firms’ decisions to layoff workers, thereby
introducing substantial uncertainty and arbitrariness in the process.
Layoff taxes are a much better instrument for forcing firms to face
the implications of their layoff decisions.
Let me wrap up this section.  The complications I have explored
may lead some readers to reject the whole architecture—to give up
on state-provided insurance so as not to have to confront the issues
of financing. I return to the issue of self-insurance below, but I am
quite sure this conclusion is wrong. Optimal tax and insurance sys-
tems are, by their nature, complicated. This is no reason to reject
them in toto, just as the complexity of the tax system does not justify
eliminating government spending. The goal must be to provide in-
surance at the smallest cost in terms of efficiency. The message from
this and the previous section is that the basic architecture needed to
do so is a simple combination of unemployment insurance and em-
ployment protection. The details are complex and must be carefully
worked out, but this should not obscure the basic architecture.
3. TWO ISSUES OF RELEVANCE TO LATIN AMERICA
This section takes up two issues that appear particularly relevant
in the context of labor market reforms in Latin America. The first is
the role of severance payments, while the second is the role of self-
insurance by workers and of mandatory unemployment accounts.
3.1 Severance Payments
So far, I have described a system based on unemployment benefits
combined with layoff (and possibly payroll) taxes. I have not mentioned
severance payments—direct payments from firms to workers at the376 Olivier Blanchard
time of separation. The two central issues with regard to severance
payments are whether they can serve as an alternative to the system
I have described and whether they might play a role of complement-
ing unemployment insurance within that system.
As for the first issue, severance payments are a very poor alter-
native to the system I have described. The basic reason was addressed
in the discussion of the benchmark. Severance payments provide very
poor insurance against the main source of uncertainty associated with
unemployment, namely, unemployment duration. Some economists
argue that lump-sum payments such as severance payments provide
strong incentives for the unemployed to search for another job. In-
deed they do, but this comes at the cost of very poor insurance. Any
need to provide search incentives is better accomplished by a benefit
schedule in which unemployment benefits decrease with the dura-
tion of unemployment.
The analysis presented above provides other arguments against
severance payments as unemployment insurance. As we have seen,
financial market imperfections may make it optimal to have lower lay-
off taxes, while providing unemployment insurance to the workers. This
is easily done in a system in which unemployment insurance is financed
partially by layoff taxes and partially by payroll taxes. It is impossible
under severance payments, however, where by construction payments
by firms are equal to the benefits received by workers. Also, some firms
may simply go bankrupt. Under severance payments, workers bear the
bankruptcy risk and may thus get nothing. In the presence of unem-
ployment insurance, the risk is taken on by the unemployment agency,
so workers can still receive unemployment benefits.
Nevertheless, severance payments should still be considered as an
alternative to unemployment insurance plus layoff taxes when a coun-
try is at an early stage of institutional development. Running an un-
employment agency—from keeping track of the employment status of
workers to monitoring search activity and distributing benefits—is a
complex operation. In countries with limited institutional capacity, sev-
erance payments may be the best that can be done, despite their short-
comings. As such countries develop, they should move from a system
based on severance payments to one based on unemployment benefits
and layoff taxes. One of the political challenges in such a transition is
how to decrease severance payments while introducing unemployment
insurance—an issue relevant for Chile. If unemployment insurance is
introduced and severance payments are not reduced roughly in pro-
portion, the outcome may prove very inefficient.Designing Labor Market Institutions 377
This brings me to the second issue, of whether severance pay-
ments have a place within the system of unemployment insurance
and layoff taxes. The answer is probably yes. Losing a job involves
two different costs. The first is the cost of being unemployed for some
time, which depends on how long one is unemployed. The second is
the cost of becoming unemployed, which is incurred even if another
job is found right away. This is a psychic cost involving the loss of a
network of workplace friends, the loss of self-esteem, and so on, and
it can be substantial, especially for workers with high seniority.
Two characteristics of this psychic cost are relevant here. First,
it can be assessed at the time of separation. This implies that in con-
trast to the first cost, it can be largely compensated by a one-time
payment, that is, by severance payments at the time the layoff takes
place. Second, it is likely to be a function of seniority. The longer the
worker has been in the firm, the higher the psychic cost of losing a
job. This suggests that the payment should be increasing, perhaps
even convex, in seniority.
Thus while severance payments are an inferior way of delivering
unemployment insurance, they may be justified as partial compensa-
tion for the loss associated with losing a long-held job. This points to
a complementary role for limited severance payments, increasing in
seniority, in addition to unemployment insurance.
3.2 The Role and Scope for Self-insurance
Given the distortions associated with any realistic system of state-
provided unemployment benefits, one may ask whether it would not
be better simply to rely on self-insurance by workers, so as to avoid
all these problems. By self-insurance, I mean the accumulation of
sufficient precautionary saving by workers to be used if and when
they become unemployed. Jean and I have just started working on
this set of issues, so what follows is speculative.
Self-insurance clearly alleviates some of the problems discussed
above. Consider an economy in which some insurance comes from
self-insurance by workers and some insurance is provided by the state.
A strong reliance on self-insurance reduces some of the moral hazard
problems discussed earlier: when workers self insure, they have strong
incentives to search for jobs should they become unemployed. Self-
insurance also reduces the gap between ex ante and ex post wage
setting and thus reduces expected costs for firms.
Self-insurance is not sufficient on its own, however, and cannot
provide a full substitute for state-provided insurance. Compare saving378 Olivier Blanchard
for retirement and saving for unemployment. The time of retirement
is roughly known in advance; it is a long way away when one starts
his or her working life, and it is thus easy to plan for. In contrast,
unemployment is uncertain; it often comes early in working life (in-
deed often at the very start), when workers have not accumulated
substantial funds. In short, while one may well want to rely on indi-
vidual retirement saving, the arguments do not carry over to indi-
vidual unemployment saving. Without state-provided insurance, some
of the unemployed are likely to have insufficient funds to maintain
an adequate level of consumption.
In practice, existing individual unemployment account systems
always include some additional state-provided insurance, for example,
allowing unemployed workers to borrow up to some ceiling, either
directly from the state or from financial institutions through a state
guarantee. These additional provisions raise many of the same is-
sues discussed earlier. How much should the state provide or guar-
antee, and in what form? How does the state ensure that firms
internalize the cost of these guarantees, thereby motivating them to
take efficient layoff decisions? I do not yet know the answer to these
questions, but the optimal architecture probably includes some self-
insurance by workers, within a system of state-provided unemploy-
ment insurance and layoff taxes.
4. SOME CONCLUSIONS
I end by stating a number of broad conclusions, probably with
more conviction than is warranted.
4.1 Social Protection and Efficiency
Countries can provide high social protection to workers, without
large sacrifices in efficiency. This requires three main tools:
— The provision of unemployment insurance through an unemploy-
ment agency. Benefits can be generous, but they must be condi-
tional on active search and job-taking. The idea of requiring the
unemployed to take “acceptable jobs” or lose benefits is appealing,
and it underlies reforms in many European countries. In principle,
it provides insurance contingent on the state of the labor market.
If there are truly no jobs, the unemployed continue to receive ben-
efits, as they should. If there are jobs and the unemployed do notDesigning Labor Market Institutions 379
take them, they lose benefits, as they should. In practice, how-
ever, it is difficult to define what constitutes an acceptable job
and to enforce the conditional receipt of benefits.
— Employment protection, in the form of layoff taxes rather than
judicial intervention.
— Reliance on a negative income tax rather than on a minimum
wage to ensure that even low-productivity workers have an ad-
equate level of income. A minimum wage should be set to avoid
the worst cases of exploitation by firms, but it should be a true
minimum, rather than a living wage. If the productivity of the
lowest-productivity workers is less than is needed for them to
live decently, the difference must be made up by the state, not
through the imposition of a minimum wage.
4.2 The Sins of Europe
In light of the characterization of good labor market institutions
described in this paper, many European countries committed three
sins. First, they often chose open-ended unemployment benefits or
assistance, and, for some categories of workers, chose very high re-
placement rates (defined as the ratio of after-tax benefits to after-tax
wages); this creates few incentives for some of the unemployed to look
for work. Second, they established heavy judicial and administrative
employment protection. Nearly all European countries finance unem-
ployment benefits through payroll rather than layoff taxes, which, by
itself, would lead to excessive layoffs. This is offset, however, by high
judicial and administrative employment protection. In many countries,
judges can second-guess and overturn the decision of a firm to layoff
workers. This should not be the case. Third, they relied too heavily on
the minimum wage rather than a negative income tax.
In most of these countries, reforms are taking place at all three
margins. The highest replacement rates have been reduced. New
labor contracts have been introduced, subject to simpler and more
limited employment protection.3 Many countries have introduced some
form of a negative income tax. There is still a long way to go, but the
movement is in the right direction.
3. The existence of two types of contracts, some with limited protection and
some with full protection, raises other issues, but this is a topic for another time.
See, for example, Blanchard and Landier (2002).380 Olivier Blanchard
4.3 Lessons from the Unemployment Miracles
In some countries, unemployment has either remained low (in
Sweden, for example, except for a sharp cyclical upturn in the early
1990s) or declined dramatically after increasing in the 1970s and 1980s
(for example, in the Netherlands). These countries have achieved
low unemployment without dramatic labor market reforms. They have
eliminated excesses, but continue to offer high levels of social protec-
tion, even relative to the European average. Institutional reforms
probably played some role in the decrease in unemployment. Wage
moderation was a major factor, however, and this is not easily ex-
plained by changes in institutions. It seems mostly to reflect the atti-
tudes of unions in collective bargaining.4 In countries where collective
bargaining is important, good labor relations, trust between unions
and firms, and some form of wage coordination both seem essential
to maintaining low unemployment in the face of major adverse shocks.
4. I draw here on Blanchard and Phillipon (2003), with apologies for yet
another self reference.Designing Labor Market Institutions 381
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